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Abstract
We describe a Fourier-theoretic formula for the probability of rational outcomes for a
social choice function on three alternatives. Several applications are given.
 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Condorcet “paradox” demonstrates that the majority rule can lead to
a situation in which the society prefers A on B, B on C, and C on A. Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem (1951) [1] asserts that under certain conditions if there are
at least three alternatives, then every non-dictatorial social choice gives rise to
a non-rational choice function, namely there exists a profile such that the social
choice is not rational.
A profile is a finite list of linear orders on a finite set of alternatives. (We
will consider the case of three alternatives.) We consider social choice functions
which, given a profile of n order relations Ri on a set X of m alternatives,
yield an asymmetric relation R on the alternatives for the society. Thus, R =
F(R1,R2, . . . ,Rn) where F is the social choice function. If aRib we say that
the ith individual prefers alternative a over alternative b. If aRb we say that the
society prefers alternative a over alternative b. The social choice is rational if R
is an order relation on the alternatives.
A principal condition for social choice functions: “Independence of irrelevant
alternatives” asserts that for every two alternatives a and b the society’s choice
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between a and b depends only on the individual preferences between these two
alternatives. In other words, the set {i: aRib} determines whether aRb.
There is an extensive literature on the probability of non-rational outcomes
in voting schemes when individual preferences are uniform and independent
(see Gehrlein [10]). We will consider this probability for general social choice
functions on three alternatives.
Our main result is a Fourier-theoretic formula for the probability of non-
rational outcomes for an arbitrary social choice function on three alternatives.
Several applications are given two of which we will mention here. A social choice
function is neutral if it is invariant under permutations of the alternatives. We call
a neutral social choice function symmetric if the choice is invariant under some
transitive group of permutations on {1,2, . . . , n}. (Note: the social choice need not
be invariant under all permutations of the individuals.) For example, an electoral
voting system (such as that in the United States of America) in which all states
have the same number of voters and electors is symmetric.
Theorem 1.1. The probability of a rational outcome for a symmetric social choice
on three alternatives is less than 0.9192.
The second application demonstrates that if the outcomes of a neutral social
choice function for random profiles are rational with high probability then the
social choice is approximately a dictatorship.
Theorem 1.2. There exists an absolute constant K such that the following
assertion holds: For every  > 0 and for every neutral social choice function if
the probability that the social choice is non-rational is smaller than , then there
exists a dictator such that for every pair of alternatives the probability that the
social choice differs from the dictator’s choice is smaller than K · .
This theorem relies on a result which is proved in Friedgut et al. [7] concerning
Boolean functions whose spectrum is concentrated on the first two “levels.”
For general references on social choice theory see Fishburn [6], Sen [17], and
Peleg [15].
2. Fourier expansion on the discrete cube
Consider the discrete cube Ωn = {0,1}n endowed with the uniform probability
measure P. We will identify elements in Ωn with subsets S of [n] = {1,2, . . . , n}.
For two real functions f and g defined on Ωn their inner product is
〈f,g〉 =
∑
2−nf (S)g(S).
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The 2-norm of f is thus equal to:
‖f ‖2 =
√〈f,f 〉 = (∑2−nf 2(S))1/2.
The Cauchy–Schwarz inequality asserts that
〈f,g〉 ‖f ‖2‖g‖2.
For a real function defined on {0,1}n consider the Fourier–Walsh expansion
of f ,
f =
∑
S⊂[n]
fˆ (S)uS,
where, uS(T ) = (−1)|S∩T |. Since the 2n functions uS form an orthogonal basis
for the space of real functions on Ωn, fˆ (S)= 〈f,uS〉.
The Parseval formula asserts that ‖f ‖22 =
∑
fˆ 2(S), and more generally,
〈f,g〉 =
∑
fˆ (S)gˆ(S).
Let f be a Boolean function defined on Ωn, namely f :Ωn → {0,1}. In
this case f is simply a characteristic function of a subset A of Ωn. Denote by
P(A)= |A|/2n and note that in this case the Parseval formula asserts that:
‖f ‖22 = P(A)=
∑
fˆ 2(S).
Note that fˆ (∅) = 〈f,u∅〉 = P(A) since u∅(S) = 1 for every S. We will write ui
for u{i}.
3. The probability of irrational social choice for three alternatives
Consider a social choice function which, given a profile of n order relations
Ri , i = 1,2, . . . , n on three alternatives, yields an asymmetric relation R for
the society. Thus R = F(R1,R2, . . . ,Rn) where F is the social choice function.
aRib indicates that the ith individual prefers alternative a over alternative b.
aRb indicates that the society prefers alternative a over alternative b. The social
preference relations are not assumed to be rational ( = order relations).
Let a, b, and c be the alternatives. The social preference between a and b
depends only on the individual preferences between a and b and therefore can
be described by a Boolean function f of n variables x1, x2, . . . , xn as follows:
Set xi = 1 if aRib and xi = 0 otherwise. In addition, let aRb if and only if
f (x1, . . . , xn)= 1. Similarly, let g = g(y1, y2, . . . , yn) and h = h(z1, z2, . . . , zn)
be the Boolean functions which describe the society’s preferences between b and
c and between c and a, respectively.
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Let
p1 = P
{
x: f (x)= 1} (= fˆ (∅)), p2 = P{x: g(x)= 1} (= gˆ(∅)),
and p3 = P
{
x: h(x)= 1} (= hˆ(∅)).
We will call the social choice function balanced if p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2.
We will now consider a Boolean function on 3n variables x1, . . . , xn,
y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn. (Write x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn), and z=
(z1, z2, . . . , zn).)
Let Ψ (= Ψ3(n)) be the subset of the 3n-dimensional discrete cube corre-
sponding to these variables which arise from a rational profile namely where each
of the triples (xi, yi, zi ) is not equal to (0,0,0) or (1,1,1) for i = 1,2, . . . , n.
Note that P(Ψ )= (6/8)n.
We will introduce the following notation: For real functions f , g on Ωn let
〈〈f,g〉〉 =
∑
∅=S⊂[n]
fˆ (S)gˆ(S)(−1/3)|S|−1. (3.1)
Let W = W(f,g,h) be the probability of obtaining a non-rational outcome
from profiles of the n individuals when the individual preferences are uniform on
the six orderings of the alternatives and independent. First, note that
W(f,g,h) = P{Ψ }−1 ·
∑
(x,y,z)∈Ψ
2−3n
(
f (x)g(y)h(z)
+ (1− f (x))(1− g(y))(1− h(z))). (3.2)
Indeed, the outcome of the social choice function which is described by f (x),
g(y) and h(z) is rational if and only if the vector (f (x), g(y),h(z)) is not equal
to (1,1,1) and not to (0,0,0). Therefore, if the social choice function yields an
order relation for the society, then
f (x)g(y)h(z)+ (1− f (x))(1− g(y))(1− h(z))= 0
and if it yields a non-rational outcome, then
f (x)g(y)h(z)+ (1− f (x))(1− g(y))(1− h(z))= 1.
Theorem 3.1.
W(f,g,h) = ((1−p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)+ p1p2p3)
− (〈〈f,g〉〉 + 〈〈g,h〉〉 + 〈〈h,f 〉〉)/3. (3.3)
Proof. Let A= An = χΨ and B = f (x)g(y)h(z). We need to compute the inner
product of A and B and we will carry out this computation using the Fourier
transform.∑
(x,y,z)∈Ψ
2−3nf (x)g(y)h(z)= 〈A,B〉 =
∑
Â(u)B̂(u). (3.4)
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It is left to determine the Fourier coefficients of A and B . In our case the
Fourier coefficients are indexed by 0–1 vectors of length 3n or equivalently by
subsets of the variables. In our case, we have 3n variables: x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn,
and z1, . . . , zn. We represent subsets of these 3n variables by a triple (S1, S2, S3)
of subsets of [n]. S1 will correspond to a subset of the n variables xi , i = 1, . . . , n
and similarly S2 and S3 will correspond to the yi ’s and zi ’s, respectively.
We start with the Fourier coefficients of B . For three subsets S1, S2, and S3
of [n] let B̂(S1, S2, S3) be the Fourier coefficients that correspond to S1, S2, S3.
The multiplicative form of B , B(x, y, z) = f (x)g(y)h(z), implies a similar
multiplicative form for the Fourier coefficients:
B̂(S1, S2, S3)= fˆ (S1)gˆ(S2)hˆ(S3).
Note that A also has a multiplicative structure as the product of n expressions.
Ψ3(n) is simply the Cartesian product of n copies of Ψ3(1). Direct computation
for n= 1 shows that Â1(∅)= 3/4, Â1(U)=−1/4 when |U | = 2 and Â1(U)= 0
otherwise. It follows that Â(S1, S2, S3) is a product of n expressions one for
each i , i = 1,2, . . . , n. The contribution of i is given by the Fourier coefficients
ofA1, namely it is 3/4 if i does not belong to S1, S2, and S3, it is −1/4 if i belongs
to two out of the three Sj ’s and it is 0 otherwise. In summary, Â(S1, S2, S3)= 0
unless the triple of sets (S1, S2, S3) is special, i.e. every index i belongs to zero or
two sets Si and for special triples:
Â(S1, S2, S3)= (−1/4)|S1∪S2∪S3|(3/4)n−|S1∪S2∪S3|.
It follows that∑
(x,y,z)∈Ψ
2−3nf (x)g(y)h(z)
=
∑
fˆ (S1)gˆ(S2)hˆ(S3)(−1/4)|S1∪S2∪S3|(3/4)n−|S1∪S2∪S3|
where the right-hand side is summed over all special triples (S1, S2, S3).
The theorem follows when we evaluate∑
Ψ
(
f (x)g(y)h(z)+ (1− f (a))(1− g(y))(1− h(z)))
and take into account that (1̂− f )(S) = −fˆ (S) if S = ∅ and (1̂− f )(∅) =
1− fˆ (∅).
This completes the proof. ✷
Note that if f = g = h then relation (3.3) reduces to
W =
(
p3 + (1− p)3 −
∑
S =∅
fˆ 2(S)(−1/3)|S|−1
)
. (3.5)
In this case, p = p1 = p2 = p3.
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4. The probability of the Condorcet Paradox
4.1. A rough computation
Consider the case in which n= 2m+ 1 is odd and f , g, and h are the majority
function. Let G(n,3) be the probability of a rational outcome in this case and let
G(3)= limn→∞G(n,3). It is known that
G(3)= 3/4+ (3/(2 · π)) ·ArcSin(1/3)≈ 0.91226.
Gulibaud stated this formula without a proof in a footnote of a paper in the
1960s. Many people have since reproduced the result (see Gehrlein [10]).
Define
dm =
2m+1∑
k=1
fˆ 2
({k}).
The value of fˆ ({k}) is (2m
m
)
2−2m−1 and therefore
dm =
((
2m
m
)
2−2m−1
)2
· (2m+ 1).
Note that dm is a decreasing sequence which tends to 1/2π . Since
f (1− x1, . . . ,1− xn)= 1− f (x1, . . . , xn), (4.1)
it follows that fˆ (S)= 0 whenever |S|> 0 is even.
Proposition 4.1.
0.9092G(3) 0.9192.
Proof. Relation (3.3) asserts that in our case the probability of non-rational
outcomes is given by
1/4−
∑
S =∅
fˆ 2(S)(−1/3)|S|−1.
It follows directly that
1−G(3, n) 1/4− dm, (4.2)
and therefore, 1−G(3) 1/4− 1/2π .
On the other hand,∑{
fˆ 2(S): |S| 3}= 1/2− fˆ 2(∅)− n∑
k=1
fˆ 2
({k})= 1/4− dm
and therefore,
1−G(3, n)  1/4− dm − (1/4− dm)/9 = 2/9− 8/9dm
 2/9− 8/9 · 1/2π. ✷ (4.3)
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4.2. Gulibaud’s formula
The Fourier coefficients of the majority function are known and we will briefly
present them here. Let n= 2m+ 1. By Levenshtein’s [13, formula (46)], we have
for |s| = k,
2nfˆ (s)=
m∑
s=0
Kn,s(k)=K2m,m(k − 1).
Here Kn,s is the sth Krawchouk polynomial on n points. Now,
K2m,m(x)= (−1)m2m/m!(x − 1)(x − 3) · · ·(x − 2m+ 1)
and substituting we obtain,
fˆ 2(s)= (1/24m+2)(22m)/(m!)2(k − 2)2(k − 4)2 · · · (k − 2m)2.
This leads finally to∑{
fˆ 2(S): |S| = k}
= 1
24m+2
2m+ 1
k
(
2m
m
)(
k − 1
(k − 1)/2
)(
2m− k + 1
(2m− k + 1)/2
)
.
For k fixed and n tending to infinity this expression tends to
(
k−1
(k−1)/2
)
2−k−1k−1π−1.
It follows that
1−G(3) = 1/4−
∞∑
i=0
(
2i
i
)
· 2−2i−1 · 1/(2i + 1) · 1/π · (1/3)2i
= 1/4− 1/2π − 1/108π − 1/2160π · · · .
5. Symmetric social choice on three alternatives
5.1. Symmetric forms of social choice
Recall that a neutral social choice function is symmetric if the choice is
invariant under some transitive group of permutations on {1,2, . . . , n}.
Theorem 5.1. For a symmetric social choice on three alternatives the probability
of a rational outcome is less than 0.9192.
Proof. Neutrality implies that f = g = h and that f satisfies
f (1− x1,1− x2, . . . ,1− xn)= 1− f (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
It follows that fˆ (S)= 0 if S is even and non-empty.
Symmetry among the voters implies that the Fourier coefficients fˆ ({k}) are
equal for k = 1,2, . . . , n.
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At this point all that is required is the fact that if a Boolean function is
symmetric then
∑n
k=1 |fˆ ({k})| is maximized by its value on the majority function.
This follows at once from the fact that
n∑
k=1
fˆ
({k})= ∑
S⊂[n]
2−nf (S)
(
2|S| − n).
Therefore the sum of the Fourier coefficients,
∑
fˆ ({k}), is maximized for the
majority function and so is its absolute value.
Under the assumption that all the Fourier coefficients fˆ ({k}) are equal the
absolute value of each is maximized for the majority function.
It follows that the probability of a non-rational outcome is at least
1/4− dm − (1/4− dm)/9= 2/9− 8/9dm  2/9− 8/9 · 1/2π. ✷
This argument applies even if f , g, and h are distinct as long as they satisfy
relation (4.1).
It appears to be true that under the conditions of Theorem 5.1 the probability
for a rational outcome is always at most G(3). For this we need:
Conjecture 5.1. ∑|S|k fˆ 2(S) is maximized for every fixed k, when n tends to
infinity, for the majority function.
See Bourgain [4] for a related result.
It follows from Theorem 5.1 that the probability that a symmetric social choice
on 3m alternatives leads to a rational outcome is at most 0.91m and therefore it
rapidly approaches zero. (Problem: How rapidly?)
Another immediate consequence of relation (3.3) is the following proposition
(which also deserves a direct combinatorial proof):
Proposition 5.2. (1) If the social choice is neutral (invariant under permutations
of the alternatives) then the probability of a rational outcome is at least 3/4.
(2) If the social choice is balanced (namely, p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2), then the
probability of a rational outcome is at least 2/3.
Proof. (1) This follows from the fact that since f , g, and h satisfy relation (4.1),
all their Fourier coefficients vanish for even sized sets. An example of equality
is the following. The ordering between a and b is determined according to one
individual, the ordering between b and c by a second individual and the ordering
between c and a by a third individual.
(2) If p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2, the smallest possible value of 〈〈f,g〉〉 is obtained
if all the contributions are coming from a single set S containing two elements.
An example of equality is obtained when aRb holds precisely when this is the
preference of one out of the two first voters and the same holds for bRc and cRa.
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(This example is not entirely kosher since it violates the condition that if all
members of the society prefer a on b, then so does the society. However, if we
add this condition and let n grow we obtain a sequence of kosher examples for
which the probability of rational choice approaches 2/3.) ✷
It may also be true that if f , g, and h are monotone and p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2
then the probability of a rational outcome is at least 3/4. To show this we need
to prove that for monotone Boolean functions f and g, 〈〈f,g〉〉 is non-negative.
This seems to be related to the FKG inequality (which asserts that when f and g
are monotone,
∑
∅=S⊂[n] fˆ (S)gˆ(S)  0.) Talagrand [18] may be relevant in this
context.
6. A Fourier-theoretic proof of Arrow’s theorem (under neutrality)
There several proofs for Arrow’s theorem in the literature and a large number
of extensions and variations. Many of the proofs are similar to Arrow’s original
one and use direct and simple combinatorial arguments (see, for example,
Geanakoplos [9]). Baryshnikov [2] found a topological proof for Arrow’s theorem
in a context which unified combinatorial impossibility theorems with topological
social choice theory, an area initiated by Chichilinsky [5]. Saari [16] presented
a geometric proof.
There is no loss of generality to assume for Arrow’s theorem that the number
of alternatives is three. The theorem makes the following assumption stated in our
language on the social choice: f (x, x, . . . , x)= x for x = 0,1 and this condition
holds also for g and h.
We will make the further assumption that f , g, and h are balanced, namely
that p = p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2. This is the case if the social choice is neutral, i.e.
invariant under permutations of the alternatives.
We require the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. If f is a Boolean function and if fˆ (S)= 0 when |S|> 1 then f = 0
or f = 1 or f (x1, x2, . . . , xn)= xi for some i or f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1 − xi for
some i .
Proof 1. Let p = ‖f ‖22 = P{x: f (x)= 1}. fˆ (∅)= p and therefore
∑
fˆ 2({i})=
p−p2. Assume that p 1/2, otherwise replace f with 1−f . From the convexity
of the function φ(t)= t2 it follows that∑∣∣fˆ ({i})∣∣√p− p2
with equality only if there is one non-zero fˆ (i).
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Suppose that p = 0,1. Let x be a vector which is 1 for every i with fˆ ({i}) 0
and 0 otherwise. Then
f (x)= p+
∑∣∣fˆ ({i})∣∣ p+√p− p2
and the only way that this equals 1 is if p = 1/2 for one value of i , fˆ ({i})= 1/2
and all other fˆ ({j })’s are zero.
Proof 2 (by Ehud Friedgut). f is of the form
f = c+
∑
i
fˆ (i)ui.
Since f is Boolean,
c= |f |1 = |f |22 = c2 +
∑
fˆ (i)2.
Using this and the fact that for i = j uiuj = u{i,j}, we have that
0= f 2 − f =
∑
i
(2c− 1)fˆ (i)ui +
∑
i =j
fˆ (i)fˆ (j)u{i,j}.
From the uniqueness of the Fourier expansion we conclude that fˆ (i)fˆ (j)= 0 for
i = j , hence for at most one value of i fˆ (i) = 0, and if there exists such an i then
f =±
(
1
2
− 1
2
ui
)
. ✷
Proof of Arrow’s theorem under neutrality. We use the notation of Section 3
and assume that p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2.
f¯ =
∑
∅=S
fˆ (S)uS and f ′ =
∑
∅=S
fˆ (S)(−1/3)|S|−1u(S).
Similarly define g¯, g′, h¯, h′. Note that ‖f¯ ‖22 = 1/4 and ‖f ′‖22  1/4 with equality
only if all non-zero Fourier coefficients fˆ (S) are for |S| 1. (For the general case
‖f¯ ‖22 = p1 − p21.)
Now, 〈〈f,g〉〉 is by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality at most
√
(‖f ′‖22)‖g¯‖22.
This quantity is at most 1/4 with equality only if f ′ is proportional to g and
hence f ′ = f = g. This happens only if all the Fourier coefficients of f are on the
0 and 1 levels and since f is not constant and f (0,0, . . . ,0)= 0 by Lemma 6.1,
f = g = xi for some i .
Therefore, for W = 0 we require that
〈〈f,g〉〉 + 〈〈f,h〉〉 + 〈〈g,h〉〉 = 3/4
and it follows that f = xi , g = xj , and h= xk , and that i = j = k. ✷
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Remark. I do not have a proof along these lines for the general case of Arrow’s
theorem or for a stability result in the non-balanced case. We need to show that
〈〈f,g〉〉 + 〈〈g,h〉〉 + 〈〈f,h〉〉 = 3p1p2p3 + 3(1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)
can occur only if p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/2. Our argument shows that this is the case
when√
p1(1− p1)p2(1− p2)+
√
p2(1−p2)p3(1− p3)
+√p1(1− p1)p3(1−p3)
 3p1p2p3 + 3(1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3).
(This inequality fails, for example, for p1 = p2 = 1/5 and p3 = 1.)
For the general case improved upper bounds on the strange “inner product”
〈〈f,g〉〉 (in terms of p1 and p2) are needed.
7. Stability of Arrow’s theorem
Lemma 6.1 can be extended to the following description of Boolean functions
whose spectrum is concentrated on the first two levels:
Theorem 7.1. If f is a Boolean function,
‖f ‖22 = p and if
∑
|S|>1
fˆ 2(S) δ
then either p <K ′δ or p > 1 −Kδ or ‖f (x1, x2, . . . , xn)− xi‖22 Kδ for some
i or ∥∥f (x1, x2, . . . , xn)− (1− xi)∥∥22 Kδ
for some i .
Here, K ′ and K are absolute constants. Two proofs will be given in Friedgut
et al. [7].
Equipped with Theorem 7.1, our proof for Arrow’s theorem yields, with minor
changes, the following result:
Theorem 7.2. For every  > 0 and for every balanced social choice function
on three alternatives, if the probability that the social choice is non-rational is
smaller than  than there is a dictator such that the probability that the social
choice differs from the dictator’s choice is smaller than K · .
It follows that for balanced social choice functions the following assertion
holds: For every  > 0, as the number of alternatives tends to infinity, if
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• for every pair of alternatives there is no dictator such that the probability that
the social choice differs from the dictator’s choice is smaller than ,
then
• the probability for a rational outcome tends to zero.
(This is due to the fact that for every triple of the alternatives, the probability of
a rational outcome is bounded away from 1 and disjoint triples are independent.)
8. Concluding remarks
8.1. More alternatives and an interesting graph invariant
Extending our formula from three to more alternatives leads naturally to the
problem of identifying the Fourier coefficients for the analog of Ψ3 for more than
three alternatives.
Given a directed graph D on the vertex set 1,2, . . . , n, for every permutation
π on [n] consider the number of inversions of π among the edges of D, namely
the number of directed edges i → j such that π(i) > π(j). Denote this number
by iD(π). Call a permutation even if iD(π) is even and odd otherwise. Let sg(D)
be the difference between the number of odd permutations on the graph minus the
number of even permutations. Note that up to a sign this number depends only on
the underlying undirected graph G.
When there are m alternatives, the Fourier coefficients of the characteristic
function of Ψm are indexed by graphs G on n vertices and are given up to
a constant factor by sg(G).
Brendan McKay suggested recording the inversion number statistics as
follows: For a directed graph D with n vertices define
g(D,x)= 1/n! ·
∑
k
akx
k
where ak is the number of permutations π , with iπ (D) = k. |sg(G)| is equal
to n! · |g(D,−1)| which only depends on the underlying undirected graph. The
parameters sg(G) and g(D,x) appear to be of independent interest. Compare also
Foata and Zeilberger [8] and White and Williamson [19].
8.2. The superiority of majority
It will be interesting to use the Fourier-theoretic approach to study the old
question regarding the probability that a given alternative is preferred over any
other by more than half the voters. When the number of alternatives is larger than
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three, the Fourier-theoretic formulas are quite messy. It is known that for a fixed
number of voters, if the number of alternatives tends to infinity, the probability
of such a preferred alternative existing tends to zero. Bell [3] proved that the
tournament representing the social preferences has a Hamiltonian cycle with
probability that tends to one as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Precise
probabilistic computations seem challenging.
For arbitrary symmetric social choice functions, we conjecture that the
probability that there is an alternative which is preferred on all others tends to zero
as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. It may be true that the probability
of a Hamiltonian cycle for the social preferences tends to one when the number
of alternatives tends to infinity. For these conjectures to hold perhaps all that
is needed is that the social choice does not coincide with a dictatorship with
probability of at least 1 − . For the symmetric case, it may even be true that
these probabilities are maximized for the case of majority.
I do not have a counterexample to the following bold conjecture:
Conjecture 8.1. Let X be a set of m alternatives and let the number of individuals
n be an odd integer. Let η be an arbitrary probability distribution on the set
of orderings on X. Consider random profiles where the order relations for the
individuals are drawn independently according to η. For a symmetric social
choice function F , let p(F) be the probability that F leads to a rational social
choice. Then p(F) is maximized for the majority function.
Finally, consider neutral social choice functions where the influence of each
individual is prescribed (see, Kahn et al. [12]). It may be true that in this case the
“most rational” social choice functions (in terms of the probability for a rational
outcome) are those based on weighted majority functions.
8.3. Relation to PCP
The following remark is based on collaboration with Ehud Friedgut, Shmuel
Safra, and Uri Zwick. There are interesting connections between Theorems 3.1,
7.1, and the theory of probabilistically checkable proofs and especially a certain
test developed by Hastad [11]. Compare also with Parnas et al. [14].
Hastad described a probabilistic test, based on sampling three values of
a function f which allows to distinguish between a Boolean function which is
a dictatorship and a Boolean function whose value is not determined with high
probability by a bounded number of variables.
Our main result can be seen as a probabilistic test for checking, based on
sampling one instance for each of three balanced Boolean functions f , g, and h,
whether all these functions are determined (at least approximately) by a single
variable xj .
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Consider a social choice function as above and ask the following question:
What is the probability for the uniform distribution over rational preferences of
the individuals that aRb and bRc or bRa and cRb? For a dictatorship the answer
is 1/3. Using a similar arguments to those used here it follows that if the social
choice function is not close to being a dictatorship then the answer is larger than
and bounded away from 1/3. If f = g this yields a probabilistic test based on
sampling two values f (x) and f (y) for dictatorship. (Here, the distribution of x
and y is given by the following: the probabilities for (xi, yi) to be (0,0), (0,1),
(1,0), (1,1) are (1/6,1/3,1/3,1/6), respectively.)
We intend to study further possible applications for hardness of approxima-
tions.
Acknowledgments
I am thankful to Alex Samorodnitsky for his help in the calculations of
Section 4.2 to Ehud Friedgut and Bezalel Peleg for several useful suggestions and
to Ron Holzman and Kenneth Arrow for detecting several mistakes in an earlier
version of the paper.
References
[1] K. Arrow, A difficulty in the theory of social welfare, J. Political Economy 58 (1950) 328–346.
[2] Y.M. Baryshnikov, Unifying impossibility theorems: a topological approach, Adv. in Appl.
Math. 14 (1993) 404–415.
[3] C. Bell, A random voting graph almost surely has a Hamiltonian cycle when the number of
alternatives is large, Econometrica 49 (1981) 1597–1603.
[4] J. Bourgain, On the distribution of the Fourier spectrum of Boolean functions, Israel J. Math. 131
(2002) 269–276.
[5] G. Chichilinsky, Social choice and the topology of the spaces of preferences, Adv. in Math. 37
(1980) 165–176.
[6] P. Fishburn, The Theory of Social Choice, Princeton Univ. Press, 1973.
[7] E. Friedgut, G. Kalai, A. Naor, Boolean functions whose Fourier transform is concentrated on
the first two levels, Adv. in Appl. Math. (2001), this volume.
[8] D. Foata, D. Zeilberger, Graphical major indices, J. Comput. Appl. Math. 68 (1996) 79–101.
[9] J. Geanakoplos, Three brief proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, Cowels Foundation
Discussion Papers number 1123R, Yale University, 1997, http://ideas.uqam.ca/ideas/data/Papers/
cwlcwldppl123R.html.
[10] W.V. Gehrlein, Condorcet’s paradox and the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules, Math.
Japon. 45 (1997) 173–199.
[11] J. Hastad, Clique is hard to approximate within n1− , Acta Math. 182 (1999) 105–142.
[12] J. Kahn, G. Kalai, N. Linial, The influence of variables on Boolean functions, in: Proc. 29th Ann.
Symp. on Foundations of Comp. Sci., 1988, pp. 68–80.
[13] V. Levenstein, Krawchouk Polynomials and universal bounds on codes and designs in Hamming
spaces, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 41 (5) (September 1995) 1303–1321.
426 G. Kalai / Advances in Applied Mathematics 29 (2002) 412–426
[14] M. Parnas, D. Ron, A. Samorodnitsky, Proclaiming dictators and juntas or testing Boolean
formulae, in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization, Berkeley, CA,
2001, in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 2129, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2001, pp. 273–284.
[15] B. Peleg, Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees, in: Econom. Soc. Monographs Pure
Theory, Vol. 7, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1984.
[16] D. Saari, Informational geometry of social choice, Soc. Choice Welf. 14 (1997) 211–232.
[17] A. Sen, Social choice theory, Chapter 22, in: Arrow and Intriligator, in: Handbook of Math.
Econom., Vol. III, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 1073–1182.
[18] M. Talagrand, How much are increasing sets positively correlated? Combinatorica 16 (1996)
243–258.
[19] D. White, S.G. Williamson, Combinatorial and multilinear aspects of sign-balanced posets,
Linear and Multilinear Algebra 49 (2001) 169–181.
